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ABSTRACT
The first part of this article asks if the Creditors’ Bargain Model, long employed by
insolvency scholars as the starting point for many an analysis, can explain or justify even the
most distinctive and fundamental feature of insolvency law. After examining the defining
features of the model’s construction, the role of self-interest and consent in it, and its ex ante
position, it is concluded that the Bargain model can neither explain nor legitimate the
coercive collective liquidation regime.
The second part of the article develops an alternative model to analyse and justify
insolvency law. The starting premise is that all (but only) those affected by issues peculiarly
governed by insolvency law are to be given a choice in selecting the principles which would
determine their rights and obligations. Once these parties have been identified, they are to be
given equal weight in the selection process, since their legal status (whether they are
employees, secured or unsecured creditors, etc.), wealth, cognitive abilities, and bargaining
strength, all are morally irrelevant in framing rules of justice. This part of the article
introduces the notion of a constructive attribute, characteristics this society accepts its
citizens should have in their role as legislators. So all parties affected by insolvency issues
are regarded as free, equal, and reasonable. The model sketched out in this part of the article
requires all principles to be selected from its choice position. Here, all the parties are
deprived of any knowledge of personal attributes, and must reason rationally. It is shown that
parties in the choice position would in fact choose the principles laying down the automatic
stay on unsecured claims. The article concludes with the demonstration that because of the
construction of the choice position and the constructive attributes of the parties bargaining in
it, the principles chosen are fair and just, and chosen in exercise of the parties’ autonomy. As
it happens, they are also efficient.
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1. INTRODUCTION
That the formal onset of insolvency has a dramatic impact on a company’s general creditors
has often been noted. When the company finds itself unable to pay its debts as they become
due,1 the freedom of action afforded to such creditors is dramatically curtailed. When the
company is to be wound up compulsorily, the winding-up order automatically suspends
(‘stays’) all proceedings against the company except by leave of the court, and any
disposition of the company’s property which has taken place between the winding-up petition
and the order is rendered void. So is any attachment, sequestration, distress or execution
against its estate.2 The winding-up order operates in favour of all those with interests in the
company’s undertaking, and its unsecured creditors and shareholders must make any claims
against it only in the formal insolvency forum.3 Equally remarkably, such restrictions on the
freedom of action of the creditors of bankrupts have been an ancient and constant feature of
this area of the law. Parliament in 1543, in its first ever attempt to deal with insolvency
issues, provided a mechanism whereby the creditors of a bankrupt were to receive the latter’s
assets in ‘a portion rate and rate alike, according to the quantity of their debt’.4 Crucially,
invoking this mechanism barred other creditors from pursuing individual strategies to collect
on their debts indefinitely.5 And the law governing corporate bankrupts gained the same
characteristic within a few years of the corporate form being made rather more widely
available.6
This article sets out to explore the collective liquidation regime defined by the
automatic stay, this central and seemingly indispensable feature of insolvency law. Its focus
is on corporate rather than personal bankruptcy, and its task is to analyse the deep structure
of the principles supporting the automatic stay. Given that insolvency law has seemingly
been wedded to some such principles throughout its existence, any attempt to understand this
branch of the law which does not explain these principles must be considered a failure. And
anyone seeking a justification for the distinctive features of this part of the law must begin by
showing why the principles behind the stay are normatively attractive. To fail to understand,
explain and justify the existence of the automatic stay is simply to fail to talk about
insolvency law as we know it. The article begins by putting to this test the best-established
model in insolvency scholarship. Can that model explain and justify the automatic stay?

2. THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN
There is little doubt the Creditors’ Bargain heuristic dominates scholarship in this area. For
almost two decades, insolvency scholars have either argued within its assumptions, or have
proceeded by marking it their first (and often primary) target. Though currently rather
1

Insolvency Act 1986 (hereafter ‘IA’) s 123.
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The bar on creditors’ rights to pursue individual remedies is analytically quite distinct from the order
in which they are paid under the collective regime; see Section 12, below. This issue is discussed in
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unfashionable, the model still constitutes the only sustained attempt at a principled analysis
of the law governing bankrupt companies (and indeed individuals). And only it has offered
anything akin to a coherent justification of the peculiarities of this branch of the law. Even
those fundamentally opposed to the project of the Bargain model acknowledge that ‘the
articulation of alternative points of view has not been nearly so coherent and well focused’.7
In view of the pre-eminence of the Bargain tradition, this article begins by asking whether the
explanation of the automatic stay given by those expounding the Bargain model is
satisfactory. For this purpose, the work of Thomas Jackson is taken as paradigmatic. He is the
progenitor of the model, and it is in his work (sometimes in collaboration with Douglas Baird
and Robert Scott) that this model attains its complete and most refined form.8 However, it
must be noted that all the criticisms made here of his work are equally applicable to all those
who have written sympathetically within the Bargain tradition.9
The Bargain model is supposedly based on the hypothetical agreement of those who
would turn out to be creditors of an insolvent company. If these people could come together
ex ante, before any lending has taken place, it is claimed they would agree to give up their
freedom of action, should their debtor become insolvent. They would realise that in such a
situation, independent action to enforce individual claims would be wasteful for all of them
as a group. It might be, for example, that the debtor’s assets are more valuable if sold
together as a going concern, than if they were disposed of piecemeal. But if the only way of
pursuing claims that was on offer was the individualistic pre-insolvency one, claims would
have to be met as and when they were brought. The result would be the inevitable
dismantling of the company’s estate, and the loss of any ‘going concern surplus’. This loss
would be suffered by all the creditors collectively.
What is more, an individualistic system puts a premium on ‘racing’ for the debtor’s
assets at the mere hint of its being in financial trouble. This is because under the
individualistic regime, as already noted, claims are met in the order in which they are
brought, and should the debtor end up insolvent, there would not be sufficient assets
available to meet all claims. It follows those first at the finishing line might receive
everything that was due to them, while others would get little or nothing. The creditors
bargaining ex ante would be likely to consider this undesirable for at least two reasons. First,
each of them would have to incur costs on monitoring the debtor’s financial state. Any
creditor who refused to do so would end up with nothing in the company’s insolvency: he
would not learn in good time of his debtor’s being in financial distress and would as a result
lose the race. But each creditor has a similar incentive to monitor the debtor, and no matter
how high the monitoring costs incurred in aggregate by all the creditors, some of them would
still end up with nothing. So the individualistic regime requires duplicative and wasteful
behaviour. Second, some creditors might be risk averse. This means they would prefer a
lower but more certain return on their loans, to a higher but riskier one.10 The individualistic
regime ensures precisely the opposite.
7

Warren ‘Bankruptcy policymaking in an imperfect world’ (1993) 92 Michigan LR 336, 338. Warren
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analysis of the wrongful trading provision’ [2000] CLJ 335.
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On risk aversion generally, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld Microeconomics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1998) (4 ed), Ch 5.
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The Bargain model claims that driven by these considerations, all the creditors would
agree to substitute a collective debt-enforcement regime for the individualistic one. This
regime would ensure that in their debtor’s insolvency, the creditors would lose the ability to
pursue their claims independently. The collective system would remove the necessity of
racing for the insolvent’s assets by eliminating the ‘first in time, first in priority’ bias of the
individualistic pre-insolvency set-up. All like claims would now be treated alike regardless of
when they were brought, so creditors would no longer need to waste resources monitoring the
debtor. For the same reason, they would now be able to expect a more certain (though for
some of them, perhaps a lower) return on their loans. What is more, a rational decision might
be made about whether the company’s undertaking should be kept together, or broken up for
sale. This would benefit all those with rights against the company’s property.
This, then, is the basic insight offered by the Creditors’ Bargain. The collective
regime defined by the automatic stay would be voluntarily selected by the creditors subject to
its coercion, if such creditors could decide ex ante what should happen in their debtor’s
insolvency. But creditors can not meet with each other in this way in real life because it is
difficult to predict ex ante who would lend to a company during its existence, and who would
have claims outstanding when the company becomes insolvent. So the Bargain model
predicts what real-life creditors would agree to if they could meet and negotiate with each
other and if there were no transaction costs, and the mandatory automatic stay merely
enforces that hypothetical bargain.11
Jackson believes his model is ‘an application of the famous Rawlsian notion of
bargaining in the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance”’.12 But it will be argued
that Jackson’s theory has little to do with Rawls. In fact, the building blocks of this theory are
decidedly non-Rawlsian, and are inspired instead by an alternative ‘contractarian’ approach
(so called because it claims to derive its explanatory force from some sort of agreement)
developed by Richard Posner shortly before Jackson first expounded the bargain.13 Apart
from the fact that both Rawls’ and Posner’s (hence Jackson’s) theories are contractarian, they
have nothing in common. This has profound implications for the Bargain model.
The Creditors’ Bargain can be analysed in terms of four elements. The first two
concern the nature of the participants in the bargain. The third is the notion of consent (hence
the ‘bargain’ terminology), and the final element is the ex ante position where the
negotiations take place (this is supposedly the model’s version of the Rawlsian ‘original
position’). These elements are examined in turn below.

3. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE BARGAIN MODEL
It is quite crucial to be clear about the identity of the actors in Jackson’s model. Note first of
all that in the Creditors’ Bargain, the bargain is hypothetical, but the creditors are quite real.
The argument is that actual creditors in a (or any) real-life transaction, if allowed to haggle
with each other before anyone lends anything, would agree to the collective regime. ‘[The]
hypothetical bargain analysis provides indirect evidence of what real world parties would, in
fact, agree to.’14 So the notional bargain would have been concluded by ‘actual people,
deploying actual endowments of skill and energy and character, making choices under
11
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uncertainty’.15 This means participants in the Creditors’ Bargain have the sort of attributes
that creditors in real-life transactions have. The various parties who give consent here lend
either secured or unsecured, are ‘systematically faster... or friendlier with Debtor’ than
others, and are able to affect the (notional) bargaining process differently according to their
‘relative savvy and bargaining skills’.16 Let us call this the Real Parties premise.
These ‘real world parties’ must together make a (hypothetical) choice of the
governing insolvency principles. This choice is restricted only by the ‘natural ignorance’ of
the eventual outcome of their transactions with the debtor.17 Let us designate this the Natural
Ignorance premise. Importantly, creditors continue to have, and know they have, all the
various attributes that make them different from each other at the time that the notional
bargain is to be concluded.18
Note that in a way, Natural Ignorance is quite an unsurprising condition. It demands
that before being asked (notionally) to consent to the automatic stay, creditors should be
denied knowledge of what would happen to their particular debtor. They should not know if
the latter would become insolvent while still indebted to them. They should not be aware of
how well-positioned they would be in this particular transaction to win an individual race to
the court in order to obtain a judgment and enforce it against the debtor’s assets, if there is no
collective insolvency regime and this debtor gets into difficulties. But as already noted, they
should continue to be aware of who they are, of whether they are systematically faster than
other creditors in this particular transaction, of whether they have inside knowledge of the
debtor’s business affairs by virtue of being one of its directors, etc. The creditors’ ignorance
is ‘natural’ because it is precisely the sort real creditors at some actual pre-transaction stage
could be expected to be in, no more and no less.
Strangely, though, it might be (and has been) objected that to impose this condition
on Jackson’s model is to construct a man of straw which might eventually prove easier to
knock down. It might be claimed that Natural Ignorance is too harsh a restriction to impose
on the model, and can not be regarded as necessary to a faithful reading of it. In particular,
what the creditors know about themselves in the ex ante position should be construed
otherwise than by way of this condition.
The objection, which will be explained in more detail below, has been put to the
present author a number of times, and appears to those making it to be very straight-forward
indeed. In reality, it is a complex one, and can only be met through some understanding of the
philosophical underpinnings of the Bargain model. Its significance will become increasingly
apparent as the argument progresses, and it will decisively be shown to be untenable only
towards the end of this article.19 But a start can be made in that direction now. Here are a
couple of preliminary points. Natural Ignorance requires creditors to know who they are, how
good are their debt-collection skills, and how they are related to the debtor. Note first of all
that this is the only form of restriction on the creditors’ knowledge compatible with the actual
text of Jackson’s (and Scott’s) argument. Any other reading simply ignores the repeated and
emphatic reliance placed by its creators on this element of the model. Jackson’s argument is
replete with references to the knowledge the negotiating creditors have of their own abilities
and characteristics.20
15
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And second, there are substantive internal reasons for saying Jackson regards Natural
Ignorance as a mainstay of his theory. His treatment of tort creditors is an example. Natural
Ignorance requires that the participants in the bargain be aware of personal attributes, but
unaware of the contingencies which would eventually arise from the operation of the debtor’s
business. On this view, victims of the debtor’s tort who would have claims outstanding
against it when it becomes insolvent, should have no place in the hypothetical ex ante
bargain, since their status qua creditor arises precisely from the operation of the debtor’s
business. Now it would seemingly be easy for the proponents of the Bargain model to argue
that tort creditors too be consulted hypothetically at the pre-transaction stage when the
bargain is concluded. But this would violate the Natural Ignorance condition, and if true to its
premises, the Bargain model should resist the temptation of attaining this otherwise desirable
extension of its scope (to include within its explanatory and justificatory ambit this type of
creditor as well). And in fact, Jackson states that:
‘[Whatever] the merits of the claim that society owes [tort] victims protection[,] this
protection does not derive from the consensual arrangements that would underlie any
ex ante creditors’ bargain. Distributions to nonconsensual claimants are conceptually
different from those that would be agreed to in any bargain in which individual selfinterest was a central feature.’21
Now of course if non-consensual claimants were to be given a say in the ex ante bargain, then
it would hardly be surprising to find the rules chosen in it provided for distributions to them,
precisely because individual self-interest was a central feature of the mode of selection of
those rules. (X, a tort claimant-to-be, would demand at the pre-transaction stage that his
interests be taken into account, should the debtor company become insolvent.) And yet the
expositors of the model decisively reject any suggestion that such claimants be given locus
standi in the hypothetical agreement. Nor is this failure to include simply a matter of
oversight. It is not that this move – hypothetically asking future tort creditors the question
‘How would you like to be treated in your debtor’s insolvency?’ -- just never occurred to
those expounding the Bargain model! As noted, Jackson and Scott explicitly consider and
reject the suggestion, on the basis that the inclusion would be conceptually inconsistent with
their model. In fact, the only way to explain Jackson’s refusal to extend his model to include
tort creditors at the ex ante stage is to point to the strict adherence on his part to the
requirements of Natural Ignorance. Such adherence is not merely accidental or incidental.
Jackson and Scott insist it is a ‘central premise’ of the bargain.22 We must take them at their
word.23

21

Jackson and Scott ‘Nature’, p 178 (emphasis added).
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In view of these preliminary points, and those to be made later, it might be observed those objecting
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happens, those denying any necessary link between the model and Natural Ignorance do not generally
appear too sympathetic towards Jackson’s (and Scott’s) project as a whole.
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4. THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN THE BARGAIN MODEL24
The principle of consent has great intuitive appeal in normative theory. The fact that one has
agreed to accept a particular obligation, or to the application to his situation of a certain
policy, is a good moral reason for enforcing that obligation against him or applying that
policy to him. If actual consent is for some reason unobtainable, then it is argued ‘implied’
consent may be relied upon to the same effect.25 The Creditors’ Bargain repeatedly invokes
some sort of consent on part of creditors to justify some or other aspect of insolvency law.26
But the principle of consent is notoriously deceptive.27 So this Section seeks to determine the
precise nature of the consent at play here. The issue is approached from two directions. First,
what sort of propositions are the creditors being asked to consent to? And second, how is it
determined whether creditors have consented to those propositions?

a. Preferences
So, what sort of propositions are being put to the creditors for approval at the hypothetical
negotiations? Suppose a choice must be made between Rules P and Q. Rule P lays down that
in a company’s insolvency, its unsecured creditors would lose the ability individually to
proceed against it, and a collective regime would take over. Rule Q, on the other hand, allows
the pre-insolvency ‘first come, first served’ system to continue to prevail. X Ltd. is a weak,
over-stretched trade creditor. It anticipates that it would not have enough resources to expend
on monitoring its debtors’ prospects and financial health, and that it is likely to be beaten in
most individualistic races for the debtors’ assets by better-resourced competitors, should any
of its debtors become insolvent. Suppose that X is asked to express a preference between
Rules P and Q, based on whatever considerations appeal to it. It is obvious X has strong
reasons of self-interest for supporting P, and little reason for choosing Q. So Rule P is
applied to all transactions. X is now taken over by a large conglomerate, and finds it has
plenty of resources at its disposal to divert to remaining abreast of its debtors’ financial
health. Realising it can ensure a place at the head of the queue for the assets of most of its
insolvent debtors in an individualistic regime, X now indicates it wishes to change its
preference, opting (as could be expected) for Rule Q. How does the Creditors’ Bargain deal
with this request?
The challenge posed by this thought experiment to the Bargain model may not be
immediately obvious. The model seeks to justify the mandatory automatic stay on unsecured
claims by suggesting the creditors themselves would accept that regime, if only they could be
consulted before lending anything. The problem, though, is that there is nothing within the
model to suggest preferences expressed at a time t1 should be any more binding than those
revealed at a later time t2. Now, if the creditors were being asked to choose a just or fair
system for governing unsecured claims in their debtor’s insolvency, or even an efficient one,
then (in our example) X’s change of mind would smack of hypocrisy and Jackson could
recommend that X’s request be rejected.28 But crucially, the bargain is supposed to be based
solely on unconstrained choices, and more specifically (as discussed in the next Section), on
one’s self-interest.
24

The arguments in Sections 4 and 5 draw frequently on Dworkin ‘Why efficiency?’ (1980) 8 Hofstra
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It is important to understand why this is the case. Remember that Jackson’s theory is
an ‘economic’ model, i.e. based on the tenets of Law and Economics, and therefore on a
particular view of neo-classical microeconomics. And the latter in turn revolves around
individuals revealing preferences in the market. The argument in microeconomics often is
that despite being guided by nothing but rational self-interest, and given conditions of
complete markets, sufficient competition, information and resource flows etc., the
preferences expressed by the individual participants in the market ensure that the market
tends towards efficient equilibrium (which is taken to be a desirable state of affairs). The
argument derives its force from its demonstration that no appeal to notions like ‘morality’,
‘justice’, or ‘fairness’ is required for (desirable) efficiency to be attained. Here, individuals
are not deliberately making efficient choices (or ‘fair’ ones, whatever that might mean in this
context).
So the Bargain model is based on nothing but self-interested preferences. Jackson
nowhere even hints that anything else at all motivates the creditors’ choices.29 But the
problem is that, in our example, X Ltd. has an equal incentive to express contradictory
choices at different points in time, both driven by exactly the same motivation. So why
should the choice made at time t1 be reified in the law, while the contrary one made at t2 is
simply ignored? Someone might wish to reply that the choice at time t1 would have
encouraged legitimate expectations about how future transactions would be dealt with, so it
should be held binding. But this reply misses the point. The order of choices is arbitrary and
could be reversed (a rich creditor which had chosen the individualistic regime at t1 is newlyimpoverished and now wishes to choose the collective one). In that case, the Bargain model
should insist the reified choice is the one in favour of the individualistic regime, hence
providing no support for our collective system. Or it might be stipulated that the choice made
at time t2 should only affect transactions taking place at t3, t4, etc. Since there would be no
retroactivity, there could be no confounded expectations, and the automatic stay could be
abandoned thenceforth for the free-for-all system.
The point should be somewhat clearer now. The Creditors’ Bargain model is based
on the preferences it claims would be revealed by creditors at a hypothetical pre-transaction
stage. But those preferences are shaped by nothing except individual self-interest, and
creditors could be expected to express different preferences at different times. If the parties’
self-interest shifts, for example, so would their preferences. If true to its premises, the model
should then recommend that so should the law. Such a chameleon-like law is not our law (nor
should it be), and the Creditors’ Bargain model provides no justification for the compulsory
collective forum marked by the automatic stay.

b. Type of consent
Perhaps we are being too hasty. Perhaps the ex ante position of the model, to be considered
later, provides a uniquely privileged point in time, so that even mere preferences revealed
then ought to be considered binding. So let us leave this argument for the moment, and move
on to consider the type of consent employed by the Bargain model. A four-fold classification
is convenient for our purposes.30 The argument which follows is not based on isolating
varieties of consent which are somehow essentially and necessarily distinct. It simply
identifies four points on a continuum, and there will inevitably be some overlap between
‘adjacent’ categories. Suppose A and B negotiate with each other freely, acquire and share all
29

No reference can be made to Jackson’s work here since the text asserts a negative. So the reader is
invited to consult Jackson’s work and confirm none of his substantive arguments turns on anything but
self-interest.
30
Dworkin ‘Efficiency’, p 577, and Brudney ‘Consent’, pp 263-8.
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the relevant information, and then enter into a contract of sale. They can then be taken to
have given express consent to the terms of that agreement, and those terms may legitimately
be held against either one at a later date. But of course consent of this sort has no role to play
in the Creditors’ Bargain. The latter is based on the very premise that it would be impractical
to get such consent from all the creditors, not least because it would be prohibitively
expensive to identify all the parties who would lend to a particular debtor during the latter’s
lifetime, and who would have claims outstanding when the latter becomes insolvent.
Suppose now that after A and B concluded their agreement, there arose a dispute about
an issue not explicitly discussed in its text. But assume further that both A and B had thought
about that issue themselves while the agreement was being negotiated, and had each reached
the independent conclusion that any such dispute would and ought to be resolved by applying
Rule X (for the sake of simplicity, say each wrote a note to herself to this effect at that time).
In this case, Rule X has received unexpressed consent from both parties, and it would be fair
to hold them to it later. But again, the Creditors’ Bargain can not be relying on unexpressed
consent to the automatic stay, since it would stretch credulity too far to assume all creditors
affected by the stay had in fact thought about and somehow accepted it in their mind. At the
very least, the Bargain model presents no evidence in support of any such claim.
Next comes reconstructed consent. Suppose A and B disagree about the currency in
which payment for their contract should be made. But neither thought about or brought up
this issue during their negotiations. As it happens, though, both operate in an industry where
(unless otherwise agreed), the payment is always made in the seller’s currency. So
scrupulously is this practice adhered to, in fact, that a reasonable person in either party’s
shoes would expect her dealings also to be subject to it, and in entering into the transaction
nonetheless without stating otherwise, could be taken to have consented to it. In this case, A
and B can legitimately be held to have given reconstructed consent to the seller’s-currency
‘rule’, which might be enforced against either one.
Yet again, though, the Creditors’ Bargain could not be relying on this variety of
consent. Note that in our example, A and B belong to a particular commercial community,
and it is only by virtue of this that the community’s practices can be held applicable to them.
The community already exists, and its customs (or at least some of them) are already
accepted as legitimate. The reasonable person said to be able to anticipate the application of
such a custom to her situation is ‘reasonable’ precisely because her expectations are
consistent with what that community finds acceptable. But what if the existence of the
custom, rule or practice itself – and not merely its application to some situation – stands in
need of justification? Suppose it is argued that the seller’s-currency rule is justified because
A has given it reconstructed consent. And we know A has given such consent because a
reasonable person in her shoes would have consented to that rule. But the reasonable person
can only be said to have consented to the rule because both the existence of the rule, and its
legitimacy, are already being assumed (or are being demonstrated elsewhere). So this attempt
to justify the rule itself simply begs the question. Similarly, since the Creditors’ Bargain is
supposed to justify the very institution of insolvency law, and in particular of the stay on
unsecured claims in a company’s insolvency, it can make no appeal to reconstructed consent.
We come finally to counterfactual consent. The label itself indicates that if X is said to
have given counterfactual consent to a rule, then he has not in fact consented to it.
‘[C]ounterfactual consent is not some pale form of consent. It is no consent at all.’31 The
argument here really is that the rule should be applied to X quite independently of whether he
has consented to it, and the latter is merely the facade behind which the real work is done.
Consent here is a rhetorical device; the force of the argument lies elsewhere.
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How would one argue that X should be taken counterfactually to have consented to a
policy or rule? One popular approach is to suggest the policy is in X’s self-interest. So if
given the opportunity, he would freely accept it. This form of argument is very common to
much of Law and Economics where appeal is made to consent.32 It is also at the core of the
Bargain model. Recall the discussion above. Since the collective liquidation regime
characterised by the automatic stay is so clearly in the common interest of creditors, it seems
only reasonable to conclude they would have consented to it, if asked in advance.
Note though that what is in X’s self-interest is a function of knowledge. This might
seem strange, but is in fact fairly straight-forward. Suppose X is risk-preferring, and proposes
to buy a ticket in a fair lottery at time t1. At t2, he actually buys the ticket, and at t3, he
discovers his ticket has lost. Now given X’s attitude to risk, buying the ticket increases his
utility and was in his interest ex ante, before the lottery took place. But this is premised on X
having no more than the knowledge he did in fact have at t1. Had X somehow discovered
then (at t1) that the ticket he was buying would lose, the purchase would not have been in his
interest.
So it is crucial in any argument based on self-interest to specify when the calculation
of self-interest is to be made, and how much is known about the world at that point. The
automatic stay might be in X’s self-interest before it becomes clear (to X himself or
‘objectively’) how advantageous a position he would be in to grab his debtor’s assets when
the latter becomes insolvent. The stay would not be in X’s interest once it became known X
was ahead of fellow creditors, and would in fact have been able to claim back all he was
owed, had the ‘grab rule’ continued to govern.33 The Bargain model is based on the
creditors’ self-interest. But that self-interest depends on what is known about circumstances
relevant both to the transaction, and to the actor whose interest is being calculated. So, at
what point in time -- or what is the same thing, at what state of knowledge -- does the model
determine the parties’ interest? And why is that point of time, or that state of knowledge,
privileged, so that any choice then made ought to be considered binding?

5. THE EX ANTE POSITION
The bargain is to be concluded before any lending has taken place, and the parties are unsure
how they would fare under any regime picked to govern the situation, should their debtor
become insolvent. This is the model’s ex ante position, and it is crucial in generating
normative appeal. The argument seems to be that since creditors do not know how wellplaced they would be to race for the debtor’s assets, they can not bias the selection process so
as to produce principles favouring them at the expense of others. But recall that in the terms
adopted above, the bargaining creditors are Real Parties in Natural Ignorance. They might not
know how a particular transaction is going to turn out, but they are aware of whether they are
systematically faster than their competitors, or of whether they wield special influence over
the debtor, etc. Keeping in mind these defining features of the ex ante position, let us
examine the two closely-related ways in which the position can be interpreted. On either
view, does the Bargain model predict that all creditors equally would accept the automatic
stay?
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On the first interpretation, we focus on the perspective of a single creditor and ask
whether the stay would be acceptable to him. Take C Ltd., a trade creditor newly entering
into business. Suppose that of the first ten loans it makes, five have to be collected through
court proceedings, and three of these debtors go into insolvent liquidation. C’s employees are
still learning to work as a team, and its finance director is inexperienced in ordinary (noninsolvency) debt-collection procedures. Before extending credit each of these ten times, C
would have calculated that the automatic stay was in fact in its interest, since it could not
hope to compete against more experienced actors who could also be expected to lend to its
creditors. Of the next ten loans made by C, five again turn out to be troublesome, and require
litigation. Yet again, three of these debtors become insolvent. By now, though, C’s
employees are proficient, and its finance director can rely on them to ensure claims will be
speedily filed, and judgments enforced faster by C than by most competing creditors. For
these transactions, C regards the individualistic regime to be in its interest. Now, the Bargain
model’s fundamental premises require ‘actual people, deploying actual endowments of skill’
to make the calculation of self-interest. So we must ask C whether it finds the stay
acceptable. But what is the correct ex ante position in which this calculation is to be made?
Is it before C’s first loan, when C is a new-comer to the business? Or after its tenth loan, or
its tenth bad loan? The choice of the ex ante position makes all the difference. And yet there
is nothing in the model to help us choose between the various ones on offer. It is not just that
the model does not predict the principles governing the automatic stay; in fact, the model’s
predictions are quite indeterminate.
This leads us to the second interpretation of the ex ante position. Here, we focus not on
one creditor over a series of transactions, but on all the creditors in a (or any) transaction. If
asked before anyone has lent anything, would all the creditors accept the stay? Take again C
Ltd. as it is after having lent a number of times and having dealt with the consequences, a
consummate collector of debts, lining up once again to extend credit. Imagine also E, F and
G, highly-skilled computer engineers who work for the debtor-to-be at a time when there are
plenty of such engineers in the labour market, and who have never before had to resort to
legal action to collect debts. Though they do not know it yet, they will become creditors for
back pay and accrued holiday remuneration, etc. Now the creditors must determine what is in
their interest. It should be clear by now this calculation is affected not only by how much is
known of a creditor’s immediate circumstances (e.g. how well-positioned C is in this
transaction to grab the insolvent’s assets), but also by what is known of his attributes (that C
is a repeat player with accumulated expertise for collecting debts) and those of his
competitors (that E, F and G do not have such skills). Given that all the parties bargaining ex
ante are aware of these facts, no agreement would be concluded. C would insist on a free-forall system, while E, F and G would hold out for the stay on all claims.
It seems then that the Bargain model does not predict what it is supposed to. Creditors
consulted ex ante (on either interpretation of this concept) would be unable to agree on how
their claims should be dealt with in their debtor’s insolvency. What is worse (recalling the
discussion from the previous Section), we have still found nothing in the model to indicate
the parties are supposed to express anything but mere preferences. So not only will
agreement not be reached in a particular transaction, but the choices made in the ex ante
position of one transaction could permissibly be altered in the next. This ensures that no
agreement would ever be attained in the ex ante position of any transaction. Creditors with a
better than average chance of winning the race to grab their debtor’s assets simply have no
incentive to give up that chance, unless they were ensured correspondingly superior rights
within the collective insolvency regime. But nothing in Jackson’s model argues for that
result.34
34
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Jackson is aware of the problem. He acknowledges that his model predicts the
collective system would only be acceptable to ‘a homogenous pool of creditors’.35 In fact, in
predicting the automatic stay, the Bargain heuristic is forced numerous times to assume all
creditors are homogenous in terms of their ability to collect debt, and to influence the
debtor.36 But of course they are not, and Jackson must explain why making the assumption
of creditor homogeneity has no effect on the model’s analytic and justificatory efficacy.
Obviously, if his model can only predict that creditors with equal debt-collection skills would
accept an insolvency system in which they were paid back equally on their debts, then it has
no relevance in analysing those far more numerous situations where there is a great disparity
in such skills among creditors. Further, there could then be no claim that the model justifies
the coercive collective regime, since it would have failed to demonstrate that nonhomogenous creditors would have given (counterfactual) consent to that regime.
Jackson does struggle with the problem. He tentatively proposes that the assumption of
creditor homogeneity ‘may not matter to the actual conclusion’.37 This would be because,
first, participation in the race for the insolvent’s assets under the ‘grab rule’ would be
expensive for all creditors, and the collective regime would be attractive to them all as a way
of making that expense unnecessary. And second, each creditor might still prefer the relative
certainty of ranking pari passu in the collective system over the unpredictability of the grab
rule.38 However, these reasons are unpersuasive, and fail to take account of the differences in
the abilities of various types of creditor. Creditors who are repeat players (like C Ltd. in our
example above) and who extend numerous loans over some period of time, enjoy economies
of scale in keeping informed of the financial state of their debtors, and in dealing with the
consequences of bad loans. So the average cost per loan for them to participate in the race for
the insolvent’s assets is lower than it is for one-off transactors. Repeat players can also
balance the risk of ranking somewhat lower in some transactions with the possibility of
ranking somewhat higher in others. This might make the aggregate risk of their portfolio of
loans fairly predictable. Again, one-off lenders would not have this ability to diversify. These
arguments should reinforce the conclusion reached above, that different creditors would
make different demands at the ex ante stage, and only some types of creditor would find the
automatic stay to be in their interest.

6. FAIRNESS IN THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN
We have already seen three problems with the ex ante position of the Bargain model. First, it
is based on mere preferences, and seems to provide no reason why some preferences should
be more binding than others. Second, the model is arbitrary, and does not explain which of
numerous possible ex ante positions -- each leading to a different conclusion -- is the correct
one. And third, the ex ante position has been defined -- knowingly and deliberately -- using
the Real Parties in Natural Ignorance conditions. Since the parties are aware of what makes
them different at the time that the bargain is supposed to be concluded, no agreement would
be reached on the automatic stay.
Can it be argued that the model actually stipulates there is no exit option, in other
words, that agreement must be reached? It might be said that there is obviously a system of
rules and principles designed to govern the claims of creditors in their debtor’s insolvency.
35
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So the question to be put to the model is not whether such a system would exist, but what sort
of system it would be. However, this objection would overlook Jackson’s observation that the
bargain is to be concluded by those aware that ‘a system of [non-insolvency] law entitlements
is already in place’ and also ‘what their priority position will be so long as [non-insolvency]
law continues to govern their rights.’39 So the creditors’ inability to agree to the automatic
stay would lead, not to paralysis, but to the continuation of the pre-insolvency individualistic
debt-collection system. If there were no exit option in the model, the model would not predict
there was no method at all for dealing with situations where the debtor defaults on multiple
debt obligations. The method it did predict, though, would not be the one we have.
Still, supposing an agreement were to be reached by the creditors ex ante, what sort of
agreement would it be? Recall again that the bargain is to be concluded by Real Parties, who
are as different from each other as creditors are in real life. At the time the negotiations take
place, they are aware of whether they are unskilled employees who might become creditors in
their employer’s insolvency, or commercial banks, or directors who will also lend to their
company, etc. Now in the bargaining, and motivated by nothing but self-interest, all the
creditors would seek to preserve as many of their pre-insolvency relative advantages as
possible, and to dilute the relative advantages of others as much as possible. Creditors would
make proposals as to the type of insolvency regime to be chosen with this aim in mind. Since
there would have to be an agreement, some give and take would be essential. This would
presumably involve giving up some of one’s pre-insolvency advantages in return for others
doing the same. But it follows that those with little pre-insolvency clout would have little to
offer in the negotiations, and therefore little bargaining strength. The weakest creditors -unskilled employees or those whose contributions could be regarded as fungible, trade
creditors in a competitive industry, etc. -- might find their interests almost completely
unprotected by the rules eventually chosen.40
It should be obvious an agreement reached under these circumstances would have little
normative appeal. The model allows those strong in real life to bring their advantages to the
bargaining table. By the same stroke, it compels the weak to be burdened by real-life
disadvantages in the negotiations. The resulting rules are shaped so as to allow the very
strong completely to overwhelm the very weak. But these rules are not just rules. Just rules
must be laid down precisely because individuals in real-life are strong, weak, or helpless, and
because it is not fair to allow the strong to overwhelm and exploit the weak. Justice redresses
bargaining advantages, but the Creditors’ Bargain merely reflects them. The model therefore
generates no normative appeal for the rules it predicts the parties would have chosen. Recall
also the note of caution struck at the beginning of Section 4(b) above. We can now
reasonably conclude that since the ex ante position is arbitrary, and since it has no normative
appeal, any suggestion that it confers some privilege even on mere preferences expressed
then, should be rejected.

39

Jackson and Scott ‘Nature’, p 499. Note yet again this crystal-clear endorsement of Natural
Ignorance.
40
This paragraph draws on Gauthier Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), Ch. 5. It
develops Gauthier’s insight that in a bargain between rational self-interested parties, Party X may not
claim any part of the pay-off enjoyed by Party Y in the ‘initial bargaining position’ (which here is the
non-insolvency debt-collection system), but only some part of the ‘co-operative surplus’. So for
example, bank-creditors would attempt to retain at least as much as they could get for themselves
without a collective system. If they could not, they would still wish to minimise the amount they would
have to give up. (On this last point, the position taken here departs from Gauthier’s, since here we
imagine a bargain even though there is no co-operative surplus from the bank’s perspective.)

14

7. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND A NEW START
It has been argued the Creditors’ Bargain has neither descriptive nor moral force. It fails on
the first count because it relies on a confused and ultimately meaningless notion of consent. It
suggests that driven by self-interest, all creditors would accept the automatic stay on
unsecured claims in their debtor’s insolvency, if only they could be consulted before lending
anything. But the interests of the creditors are a function of the time at which they are
calculated, and of what is then known about the world. The Bargain model specifies no nonarbitrary point at which this calculation could be made and as a result is quite indeterminate.
Further, it relies on nothing but creditors’ preferences, and suggests no reason why those
preferences ought to be considered binding. Creditors actually asked ex ante to choose an
insolvency regime would either be unable to reach agreement, or would pick a system
designed to reflect their pre-insolvency advantages. In any case, any agreement made under
the circumstances of the Bargain model would likely be exploitative and oppressive of
weaker parties, and would have no justificatory force.
Recall from the first Section above that the automatic stay on unsecured claims is the
most distinctive and well-established part of all of insolvency law. Since the Bargain model
can not even predict (and therefore can not explain or justify) the collective regime defined
by the stay, it can have little use in analysing any of insolvency law. But despite the fact that
Jackson is ultimately unsuccessful in explaining the automatic stay, there are valuable lessons
to be learnt from his failure. The insights gained from examining – and rejecting – the
Bargain model are useful in any attempt to do better. The remainder of this article is a modest
start in that direction.
It is suggested that insolvency law, and in particular the automatic stay on unsecured
claims, can be justified by asking what all the parties concerned would agree to, if given the
chance to bargain under suitable conditions. The consent relied on here is again hypothetical
consent. Here, though, the consent is not of ‘real world parties’, nor are the parties allowed to
deploy ‘actual endowments of skill and energy’ in the bargaining process, nor are they in
Natural Ignorance. Rather, hypothetical consent is given by all the relevant parties, conceived
of as free, equal, and reasonable, under conditions which will be referred to as Dramatic
Ignorance. As such, this model is based on ‘authentic consent’, the consent of the ‘true and
genuine person’.41
So the model developed here is again contractarian. Specifically, it is Rawlsian, and
draws on notions famously elaborated by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice,42 and restated
and modified in Political Liberalism.43 It was noted above that Jackson also claims his
Creditors’ Bargain is an application of Rawls’ methodology. But it will become apparent as
the argument progresses that ‘It is hard to exaggerate the difference between these two
versions of contractarianism.’44 The Creditors’ Bargain is a ‘mutual advantage theory’. The
Authentic Consent Model (ACM) is based on ‘justice as reciprocity’. This is discussed
below. Note also that this article is not the first manifestation of the desire to counter
Jackson’s attempt wrongly to claim Rawls as his own. Donald Korobkin constructed a selfconsciously Rawlsian alternative to the Creditors’ Bargain in 1993.45 The present work sets
off in the same direction, and follows a similar route. But while the impulse which drives
41
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both Korobkin’s essay and this article is the same, the two encapsulate radically disparate
visions of the role of insolvency law, and reach very different results. The points of
disagreement will become apparent very shortly.

8. THE PLOT
This model regards corporate insolvency law as dealing with that peculiar set of social,
commercial, and legal circumstances which arise when a company becomes insolvent.
Insolvency law is seen as laying down the fair terms of co-operation among all the parties
affected by these peculiar circumstances. The parties themselves are considered free and
equal, and as fully co-operating members of society. In this model, insolvency law is one
limb of the whole legal corpus, and (like the legal system in its entirety) provides the
guidelines for how the institutions within its province are to realise the values of liberty and
equality. The model specifies a point of view from which these principles can be seen as
more appropriate than any others to the idea of the parties conceived in this way (this is the
model’s choice position).46 The following Sections consider the model’s conception of the
person, and the point of view from which the principles to be proposed in this model are to be
judged. Here, the province of insolvency law is mapped out, and the idea of social cooperation is discussed. It will be seen that elements discussed in this Section surface again in
different guises in subsequent Sections, reinforcing and illuminating what has gone before.
This pattern will recur throughout the rest of this article.

a. The province of insolvency law
One could perhaps be forgiven the assumption that to assert that corporate insolvency law
should be seen as dealing with issues peculiar to corporate insolvency, is to assert something
trivial and banal. And yet this is one of the more controversial issues in insolvency
scholarship. A great virtue of the work of the proponents of the Creditors’ Bargain is its
clearer appreciation of the nature of insolvency law and its limits, and of the boundaries
between insolvency and non-insolvency issues. Other commentators have found these
distinctions either too fine to notice, or inconvenient enough to ignore. They seem to see
insolvency law as the panacea for most of what they regard as wrong with society. Whether it
be the under-representation of employees in corporate decision-making, the supposed
insensitivity of boards of directors to broad social concerns, or the tendency of capitalist
competition often to expose people to hardship, the solution is argued to lie in amending
insolvency law in particular ways, and applying it in a certain manner. However, it is argued
here that such an approach undermines what must be a fundamental goal of every reasonable
legal system: that like cases be treated alike. The fact is that the ambit of corporate
insolvency law is necessarily limited. To overlook this in selecting principles of insolvency
law would be to ensure the law as a whole treated similarly-placed individuals differently for
wholly arbitrary reasons.
Take Korobkin, who advocates a view of insolvency law defective precisely for this
reason. He regards insolvency law as a response ‘to the problem of financial distress’.47 He
argues that a corporation, like a household, is a focal point of social interaction for mutual
advantage. ‘In diverse ways, persons invest in the corporation and, in turn, become
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“invested” in it as a source of financial and personal fulfilment.’48 Such investments are not
made only by shareholders, creditors, employees and directors, but also by the company’s
‘customers, the friends or family of those who work for the corporation, and the citizens of
communities directly affected by its operation.’49 In fact, ‘the problem of financial distress
affects virtually all persons in society to some degree’.50 When struck down by financial
distress, the corporation -- this pivotal, almost organic social institution with its widespread
and deep-rooted ties with everyone in society -- suffers ‘a crisis in “collective autonomy”...
[losing] the capacity to regulate itself according to collectively chosen, mutually constructive
ends.’51 All the economic, personal, and social ties constructed around its existence are
suddenly in jeopardy.
Insolvency law must be seen as a response to these circumstances, addressing the
‘failure of collective autonomy’ and ‘supplying the reflective capacity that the enterprise
[now] lacks.’52 Insolvency law is not merely (or even primarily) a more efficient collective
debt-enforcement mechanism. It must do much more. It must ‘address the concerns of the
employee who fears the loss of employment’, for example.53 It must pay heed to the plight of
‘an employee who [entered] the corporation without skills or training and is thus viewed by
her supervisors as especially dispensable.’54 It must even seek to provide representation at
some level to ‘affected members of the community at large’ and their ‘diverse political,
moral, and personal values.’55 And if, in achieving these aims, insolvency law must violate
the pre-insolvency rights of those with direct financial concerns in the company, then so be
it.56 With the whole edifice of society seemingly teetering on the brink, and with so many
interests to protect and ideals to serve, who would object to the Chancery judge carrying out
some redistribution of wealth from the company’s creditors, to other groups in society?57
It is suggested this expansive benevolence is arbitrary and misguided. Korobkin’s
grand, imperialistic vision of insolvency law results from a rather simple error. Somewhere
along the way, he stops asking himself: What makes insolvency law special?
Consider Companies A, B, C, and D. A, B, and D each operates a manufacturing plant
in an identical small community. C operates two such plants in two such communities. Each
of these plants is the main employer in the area, the main focus for beneficial social
interaction of the sort described by Korobkin. Imagine these small communities having a
similar, relatively high rate of unemployment, so that workers in these plants are likely also
to be supporting out-of-work family members. Numerous small traders are dependent on each
plant, supplying raw material, selling food to the plant’s employees, transporting the plant’s
product and clearing its waste. Suppose also that each community is governed by the same
legal system, which is identical to that in England, except in one respect. Insolvency law in
this jurisdiction incorporates and reflects all of Korobkin’s concerns in a way recommended
in his essay.
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Imagine now that there is a similar serious downturn in the industries in which A, B,
and C operate. All three companies (along with thousands of others) are beset by financial
distress. A Ltd. is hit particularly hard, and being the worst prepared, is forced into insolvent
liquidation. C Ltd. responds by deciding to focus on its core competence. It sells off one of
its plants to E Ltd., and concentrates on the other. Both business units recover and become
profitable. B Ltd. meets the challenge by rationalising its operations and downsizing. Dozens
of employees ‘who [entered] the corporation without skills or training and [are] thus viewed
by [their] supervisors as especially dispensable’ are fired. B too survives the crisis. D Ltd.
has not been affected by financial distress at all. It was set up by X fifty years ago, who has
run it since as a friendly, only semi-professional enterprise, not worrying too much about
turning a big profit. At around the time A, B, and C are going through the pangs of financial
distress, X dies. X has no family, and no buyer can be found for the factory, so it is boarded
up. The heart is ripped out of the community. People lose their jobs, and other businesses in
the community dependent on D become insolvent.
The purpose of sketching out this scenario at some length is to show that Korobkin’s
analytical chain, made up of financial distress, corporate insolvency, and undesirable social
costs, breaks down at each of its links. A Ltd. initiates a formal insolvency proceeding, and
those associated with it enjoy the (dubious) benefits of Korobkin’s luxurious insolvency
regime. Arguably, they do not lose their jobs and social interaction, and are given the
opportunity to reconcile their diverse social, political and personal values, while A Ltd.’s
creditors are bled dry.58 The problem is that the provisions of Korobkin’s insolvency regime
apply only to insolvent companies, that is, those unable to pay their debts as they become
due, or whose liabilities exceed their assets.59 But what about B Ltd.? It suffers financial
distress but never becomes insolvent, and so those associated with it never get the protection
of Korobkin’s insolvency regime. Yet its most vulnerable employees suffer the ravages
Korobkin must think are exclusive to insolvency situations. If Korobkin does not think so,
then why does he discriminate between A’s and B’s workers? Why under his regime are the
former ‘better off’ than the latter, when the two groups are subject in exactly the same way to
their employers’ financial distress? Similarly, the communities woven around A Ltd. and D
Ltd. are threatened in exactly the same way, even though D is not the victim of financial
distress. Since D never becomes subject to insolvency law, it never enjoys the benefits of
Korobkin’s vision. Korobkin wants to give the community in which A operates additional
rights, but seems unmoved by the identical plight of D’s community. His model creates a
discrepancy in the treatment of people who are going through exactly the same problems.
Again, Korobkin must believe the community affected by A’s insolvency is more worthy of
protection than that devastated by D’s closure, but he provides no reason for taking that
position.
The point is simply this. Korobkin pursues goals through insolvency law which -- if
considered desirable -- ought to be pursued by the general (non-insolvency) law. If workers
deserve protection against dismissal even though they are judged superfluous to their
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employer’s plans, then this policy should be implemented generally, not merely restricted to
that minority of workers whose employer becomes subject to insolvency law.60 If people
who have not made direct financial contribution to the firm ought still to be given the right to
decide what happens to the firm’s assets, then this right should again be conferred on all
similarly-placed parties. To create these rights only when the firm becomes subject to a
formal insolvency proceeding is to make arbitrary distinctions. Korobkin claims his model
produces principles which are ‘fair’, which have ‘real normative force’.61 Unconstrained
arbitrariness of the sort found in his model is not a hallmark of fairness, nor does it commend
itself as a normative principle.62
It might be urged in response that ‘there is no reason why issues arising in insolvency
should be governed by rules or agreements formulated without regard to insolvency’.63 But
with respect, while the sentiment thus expressed is sound,64 its invocation here would miss
the point completely. Simply because an issue can ‘arise in insolvency’ does not by itself
mean it should be dealt with by insolvency law. Consider an analogy. That a murder has
taken place in a vehicle on a public highway rather than in a house (say) should not make a
difference to the law which applies to the situation. This despite the fact that the ‘issue has
arisen’ against the background of the regulation of traffic on the roads, and that the law of
murder is ‘formulated without regard’ to that background. Similarly, the issues of workers
losing their jobs, of communities being devastated when businesses close down, of tax
authorities losing revenue, all can and do arise without the company in question ever
becoming subject to insolvency law. Exactly the same issues exist whether or not the relevant
legal entity is able to pay off all its debts.65 Insolvency is here an irrelevant part of the factual
background, analogous to the number of times the letter ‘a’ occurs in the name of the
60
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insolvent’s managing director. The law as a whole should not make distinctions based on the
former any more than it does the latter.
It might also be argued that ‘it is perfectly proper to advert to [concerns about the
protection of jobs, communities, etc.] in both pre-insolvency and insolvency law.’66 With
respect, this again misses the point. If the law deals with identical issues in the same way
regardless of whether the company in question is insolvent (as it should), then insolvency law
is not playing any role at all.67 The fact that the vehicles owned by a company must obey
traffic rules regardless of whether the company is in the process of being liquidated, does not
make the traffic code part of insolvency law when it is applied to vehicles in fact owned by
insolvent companies! One would have thought the point was a simple one. To classify a part
of the law as the road traffic code is to classify it functionally, that is, on the basis that it
deals with issues specifically associated with the regulation of traffic on the roads. Similarly,
to classify another part of the law as insolvency law is to classify it on the functional basis
that it deals with issues specifically associated with corporate insolvency. The desire on part
of some insolvency law scholars to claim for their subject the greatest jurisdiction they can
might be understandable, but it is also pointless and ultimately (because of the potential for
arbitrariness) harmful.
The ACM developed here focuses, then, on what makes insolvency law special. It
provides and validates principles to govern insolvency issues. It accepts that not all insolvent
firms will come to be governed by those principles, since not all such firms would invoke a
formal insolvency proceeding or otherwise become subject to insolvency law. No part of the
law has full control over its province. Not all crimes are punished, nor all torts compensated,
nor all breaches of contract remedied. So this model makes no claims to omnicompetence on
behalf of insolvency law. At the same time, it provides a standpoint from which to judge any
proposal suggested as a candidate for an insolvency law principle. Any proposal which
passes the tests set by this model can be regarded as just, and as an appropriate principle of
that law.

b. Co-operation in insolvency situations
Within the constraints mentioned above, and with respect to the issues regarded as peculiar to
corporate insolvency, insolvency law lays down the terms of fair co-operation. Now the
commercial world is characterised by competition and often, conflict. In the circumstances of
a firm’s insolvency, some claimants (to take its defining characteristic) do not get back all (or
any) of what they are owed. Conflict seems almost to be built into the nature of things. It
might seem unrealistic to posit co-operation to the parties playing this (apparently) zero-sum
game. So it is essential to be clear about the nature of the co-operation which the ACM sees
as being at the core of insolvency law.
All the parties facing a set of peculiar insolvency issues co-operate by accepting,
regarding as proper, and being guided by certain public rules and procedures. Co-operation
takes place on terms ‘each participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else
likewise accepts them.’ 68 Each party which complies with the publicly recognised rules is to
benefit in an appropriate way, usually by being allowed to advance its own conception of the
good in those circumstances. As conceived here, then, parties governed by insolvency law
who are in a position of potential conflict inter se, nevertheless co-operate by each being
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guided by just insolvency law principles in pursuing their own self-interest, and thereby
allowing all others similarly to pursue their self-interest guided by the same principles.
Note that reciprocity of this sort is key. Each party is motivated to seek their selfinterest only in accordance with insolvency law principles regarded as just by the ACM,
because they consider it fair to do so, but only if (most) others are also seen to accept as fair
and abide by the same set of principles. If one of the participants in the institutions of
insolvency law asks why he should abide by the principles on which the institutions operate,
he can be told:
You have the opportunity to pursue your self-interest only because others
constrain themselves in ways that make for a fair cooperative venture for
mutual advantage. Constrain yourself by those same principles in return, and
you give them fair return for what they give you.69
Now there is no doubt that ‘reciprocity is a form of fairness’.70 But it has been subject
to some criticism as the basis for a just political order. (Insolvency law of course would be
part of such an order.) It has been noted that those incapable of providing reciprocal benefits
are excluded from any conception of justice based on reciprocity.71 Even when, as in the
ACM, the ‘benefit’ parties must provide to each other is to accept as fair, and abide by, the
same set of principles as everyone else similarly placed, some are excluded. These would
include the congenitally handicapped of some variety, and animals, both incapable of
upholding any principles.72 For those who ‘hope[] for a conception of justice that admits
these cases as central’, reciprocity is unsatisfactory.73
There are a number of ways of responding to this criticism. The most obvious is to
point out that in the specific context of corporate insolvency, it has little relevance. Here,
even the weakest party -- the literature mentions the tort victim, the unskilled employeecreditor and the weak trade creditor as paradigms -- is capable of reciprocating by suspending
their efforts individually to pursue whatever claims they have against the insolvent, and by
regulating their activities in accordance with fair insolvency principles.
Even on a more general, society-wide level, the criticism that reciprocity would
exclude those incapable of reciprocating from the realm of justice, still seems irrelevant.
Claims on behalf of groups such as the congenitally disabled, and animals, have often been
phrased in terms of justice. But justice is not the only social or political virtue. Not every
instance of social, or even political, interaction need be governed by it. There are other
virtues, like mercy, benevolence, empathy, altruism, charity, etc. A society might accept any
of these as political virtues. Claims on behalf of animals might still be phrased in terms of the
obligations of human beings, for example, but these obligations would flow from empathy
(say) and not justice. The desire of those campaigning on behalf of such groups to cover their
claims with the cloak of justice can be attributed either to their inability to identify other
political virtues, or their suspicion that society generally does not recognise virtues other than
justice. But such inability or suspicion is based on an impoverished view of political
discourse, and its manifestations serve merely to confuse that discourse.
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We can move on, then, keeping in mind what motivates the ACM. Within the terms of
the model, insolvency law is seen as a fair system of co-operation about insolvency issues.
All those participating in its institutions are motivated by the desire to further their selfinterest bound by a set of fair principles, and in the knowledge that everyone else is similarly
bound.

9. THE CAST
It has been mentioned that the ACM is contractarian, based on the hypothetical consent of the
relevant parties. This Section sets out the criterion by which parties are to be admitted to the
choice position, and therefore to be allowed to give their consent to -- or to withhold it from - any proposed principle.74 It should be noted that the aim of this article is (inter alia) to
provide the broad test which can identify these parties. It sets out and defends the principles
which (it is contended) ought to be applied to determine whether a particular party should be
given a say in the selection of fair insolvency law norms. The article does not itself seek to
make a comprehensive identification of all such individuals (or indeed groups).
The ACM is based on the fundamental idea that:
it is fair to require people to submit to procedures and institutions only if, given
the opportunity, they could in some sense have agreed in advance on principles
to which they must submit.75
People must be consulted on the choice of governing principles because they would later
have to submit to those principles. The only reason why their participation must be sought in
the bargaining process is because their rights, interests, and obligations will be affected by
these principles. But this means those who do not have to submit to those principles should
have no say in their selection. Suppose a set of principles does not affect the rights, interests,
or obligations of X at all. In that situation, it is difficult to see why X ought to be consulted
on how W, Y and Z -- all of whom are affected by that set of principles -- should be expected
to behave. In the ACM, insolvency law is regarded as dealing only with insolvency issues. It
follows that only parties affected by insolvency issues are to be allowed a say in the choice of
principles to govern such situations.76 Crucially, though, note that the question ‘who is
affected by insolvency issues?’ is to be answered broadly. There is no restriction, for
example, that only those with direct financial concerns in the insolvent company are to be
taken as affected by corporate insolvency. This should make it clear the ACM rejects the
narrow concerns of the Creditors’ Bargain, which restricts participation in the ex ante
agreement to those who have contracted for legal rights to the debtor’s assets once insolvency
has occurred.77 So shareholders are not included in Jackson’ model,78 nor on one view are
non-consensual creditors like the debtor’s tort victims.79
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The ACM welcomes any proposal that a certain principle be admitted into insolvency
law, and judges that proposal by asking the central question: What makes insolvency law
special? Any party -- no matter how remote it might prima facie seem to be from insolvency
issues -- can argue that its interests are affected by those issues in a way special to corporate
insolvency. There might be issues peculiar to insolvency situations which affect parties other
than creditors. Insolvency law must have principles to govern such issues when they arise,
and in selecting those principles, all those affected must be given a say. To take just one
example, the wrongful trading provisions of the Insolvency Act 198680 lay down principles
dealing with a manifestation of the old agency problem in the peculiar circumstances of
corporate insolvency. The provisions affect the rights, interests, and obligations of managers
and shareholders, as well as creditors. In deciding whether the wrongful trading provisions
can be justified, the ACM therefore allows participation to shareholders and managers, as
well as creditors.81
So the model extends participation to parties other than creditors because it focuses on
what makes insolvency law special. For the same reason, it rejects exorbitant claims of the
sort exemplified by Korobkin:
[The] problem of financial distress affects virtually all persons in society... As a
result, all persons in society should have representation in the choice of
[insolvency law] principles’.82
As already argued, issues related to financial distress which are not peculiar to corporate
insolvency are to be settled so as to prevent the creation of arbitrary distinctions between
those faced with exactly the same circumstances, based on whether they become subject to
insolvency law. If employees, members of the broader community, or their friends and family
are affected by financial distress in a way that they would be whether or not the debtor
becomes insolvent, then the choice of principles governing their circumstances must be made
in models justifying employment, general company, or social security law. As conceived of
here, insolvency law is not hegemonistic, nor does it exhaust opportunities for doing good.83

10. THE CHARACTERS
It was argued in the first part of this article that actual parties in real-life transactions have
varying bargaining power, negotiating skills, cognitive abilities, financial muscle, and clout
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with the debtor. These are the ‘real world parties’ of the Creditors’ Bargain, and while such
real-life transactions might be fair against the background of just principles, the selection of
the principles themselves can not be allowed to reflect these differences.84 Principles
formulated merely to reflect such differences, and not concerned with protecting the weak
against exploitation resulting from the differences, would not be just. The ACM claims to be
able to pronounce on the justice of insolvency law principles. It can not therefore be based on
the consent of Real Parties.
So this Section starts the process which will transform the actual people who will
eventually find themselves governed by insolvency law principles -- the cast -- into parties
capable of giving authentic consent to those principles -- the characters. This process will not
be completed until the next Section.85 This Section explains the way in which the relevant
parties are to be considered free and equal. They are also to be considered reasonable, and
this will also be explained. Finally, the role of self-interest in the ACM is described.
The key tool here is the notion of a constructive attribute.86 Constructive attributes are
stipulated features of the ACM, to be imputed to the parties in order for them to be able to
give authentic consent. In order to construct the relevant attributes, the ACM surveys the
whole legal and political culture of society. It gathers together all the data which seems
relevant. This might include any of legislative enactments and judicial precedents,
administrative and executive acts of government, the binding commitments of the State in the
realm of public international law, pronouncements of leaders of opinion in society, and so
on.87 The model then analyses this raw material and distils it to its essentials. The quest is to
define ‘the political conception of the person’.88 It is to define a certain ideal of the
individual: the ideal of the citizen as legislator in a democratic society.89 Whatever
characteristics seem relevant to this ideal are then attributed to the parties who will negotiate
in the hypothetical bargain to decide on insolvency law principles.
Note that the ACM does not presuppose any metaphysical doctrine of the person,
realist, idealist, or materialist.90 Nor does it assume the characteristics constructively to be
attributed to the parties really do exist in all (or most) actual individuals.91 Constructive
attributes constitute an ideal of the person. They define a normative view of how parties must
be placed before being asked to give consent to principles of justice. To the extent that reallife individuals lack these attributes, they fall short of what society expects of its legislators.
So to insist that (some) actual people are not free or equal or reasonable in the sense defined
below is to point out a deficiency in actual society, not in the model. Constructive attributes
define a contingent view of the person, based firmly in the political and legal culture of
society and answering to its highest conceptions. The model claims a particular society
accepts it should be governed by principles which could be regarded as acceptable to citizens
84
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thus defined. It then reverses the burden of proof, challenging those who disagree to contest
this claim. It is then up to them to show that society does not consider citizens conceived in
this way as fit to choose the governing principles of justice. (It is important to emphasise the
distinct nature of the assumption about self-interest. Except for its first sentence, the
discussion in this paragraph does not apply to that assumption. This is explained below.)

a. Liberty
The first constructive attribute is that of liberty.92 Parties affected by peculiar insolvency
issues are to be conceived of as free in three respects. First, they are regarded as ‘having the
moral power to have a conception of the good’, and of pursuing it. They are also ‘seen as
capable of revising and changing this conception’.93 One’s conception of the good is one’s
idea of one’s rational advantage. In being free in this sense, the parties are regarded as having
the ability to decide what they regard as valuable in the relevant sphere of human life. They
can choose what they want to achieve, the attachments they want to form, and the loyalties
they wish to owe.94 They are also regarded as having the right to be seen as independent of
these aims, attachments, and loyalties, and thus having the right to review and revise them,
while still retaining their political identity.95
In the less abstract but arguably no less profound terms appropriate to the realm of
corporate insolvency, this aspect of liberty models the parties’ ability to choose to contribute
financial capital to a company as secured or unsecured creditors or shareholders, or to
contribute human capital as directors or employees. It indicates that involuntary and nonconsensual creditors accept that contingencies of the sort affecting them (though often
regrettable) are inevitable in any society, and that they have the capacity to revise their
conception of the good to decide what best serves their interests once such contingencies
have occurred. This aspect of liberty also models the possibility that the same individual may
be a victim of an insolvent’s tort and have interests in common with others in a similar
position, and simultaneously be a secured creditor (directly or through a corporate entity) of
another insolvent with a range of interests appropriate to that status. One of the implications
of this aspect of liberty is therefore to counter the insidious tendency of viewing various
groups of affected parties as mutually exclusive, and as necessarily having
‘incommensurable’ aims.96
Secondly, parties are free in that they are regarded as ‘sources of valid claims’.97
While legal persons might be seen -- even in terms of their fundamental identity as citizens -as vehicles for others to attain external goals where natural persons might not, both equally
are ‘entitled to make claims on [insolvency law] institutions so as to advance their conception
of the good’.98
Finally, parties are free in that they are regarded as ‘capable of taking responsibility for
their ends’.99 Citizens are ‘thought to be capable of adjusting their aims and aspirations in
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the light of what they can reasonably expect to provide for.’ In particular, liberty entails that
the parties ‘can adjust their ends so that those ends can be pursued by the means they can
reasonably expect to acquire in return for what they can reasonably expect to contribute.’100

b. Equality
This is the second constructive attribute the parties affected by the circumstances of
corporate insolvency are regarded as having. Recall that insolvency law is thought of as
laying down the fair terms of social co-operation in the peculiar circumstances of corporate
insolvency. All the parties are equal in that all have a capacity for forming a conception of
the good under these circumstances, as noted above.101 They also all have the capacity to be
moved by considerations of reciprocity.102 By virtue of having these capacities, the parties
are (constructively) equal.103 The crucial consequence is that they ‘have a right to equal
concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern
them.’104
Equality is the most important of the parties’ constructive attributes. It is because they
are regarded as free and reasonable that they are allowed to participate in the choice of
principles. Equality is the qualifying condition, then. It is possessed by all those who can give
justice, and only such people can contract with others in the ACM.105

c. Reasonableness
Parties are regarded as being ‘ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do
so’.106 That parties have the constructive attribute of being reasonable in this way flows from
the idea of them being citizens of a society viewed as a fair system of co-operation.
Reasonable individuals are not altruistic, they are ‘not moved by the general good as such’.
They demand reciprocity from other free and equal citizens, so all can pursue their selfinterest bound by the same set of principles similarly acceptable to all.107

d. Self-interest?
Parties are also motivated by self-interest in proposing, considering, and accepting or
rejecting principles of justice to govern insolvency situations. It could be argued that in a
certain way, this too is a constructive attribute, something citizens as legislators are expected
to have in this society:
In a democratic culture we expect, and indeed want, citizens to care about their
basic liberties and opportunities in order to develop and exercise their moral
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powers and to pursue their conceptions of the good. We think they show a lack
of self-respect and weakness of character in not doing so.108
The ACM takes a more tentative view of the role of self-interest. It is hesitant about
elevating this supposed characteristic of the parties to the same normative level as liberty,
equality, and reasonableness. In fact, it makes a weaker, more contingent assumption that
parties are driven (inter alia) by self-interest. The assumption is not normative at all: the
model does not assume citizens ought to be motivated by self-interest. (Note the contrast with
the three constructive attributes discussed above.) Rather, the assumption is positive, that
citizens are in fact thus motivated. This means that if the actual parties -- to whom the
principles chosen using the model are to be applied -- are not self-interested, then the
principles will be defective to that extent.109
Having said that, a word in defence of the assumption. Suppose the principles chosen
using the model thus constructed secure certain rights to certain parties, on the assumption
that being self-interested, they would want those rights. Suppose though that the parties turn
out not to be self-interested in those respects, or to that extent. It would presumably be a
rather simple matter for them to forego the protection or advantages afforded to them by
those rights. In any case, it would be simpler than the situation of parties who are in reality
motivated by self-interest, and who are trying to claim advantages not afforded to them by
principles chosen by a model based on the assumption of their being altruistic. It is better for
you to have and to be free to give away, than for you to want but not have. In making the
assumption that parties are self-interested, the ACM errs on the side of caution.110

11. THE STAGE
This Section defines and describes the choice position. It is in this position that parties
affected by insolvency circumstances are to debate and consent to the principles which will
govern those circumstances. Recall from the first part of this article that while accepting the
possibility that institutions might be justified because they serve the antecedent interests of
all those subject to their writ, we rejected the Creditors’ Bargain because it provided no nonarbitrary point at which calculations of antecedent self-interest could be made. In the ACM,
the choice position provides the non-arbitrary, morally privileged standpoint from which
parties are to make calculations of antecedent self-interest. The normative attraction of the
principles chosen stems from the constructive attributes of those making the choice, and
features of the construction of the choice position itself. In this position, parties are rational
and Dramatically Ignorant. In order to define the choice position, these constituents of its
construction are discussed in turn.

a. Rationality
Parties in the choice position are required to reason rationally. Think of a person, whether ‘an
individual or corporate person’, who has the ability to select and pursue his own aims and
interests. ‘The rational applies to how these ends and interests are adopted and affirmed, as
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well as to how they are given priority.’111 In selecting the means with which to attain those
objectives, rationality implies the ability to be guided by such principles as: ‘to adopt the
most effective means to ends’. Rational persons can also weigh up how the final ends they
are choosing contribute towards furthering their conception of the good, and how they cohere
with each other.112
One implication of the requirement that parties in the choice situation be rational
should be noted. Transaction cost efficiency springs naturally from this assumption. If X
wants to attain objective O, and can choose between Methods A and B, both of which ensure
he will attain O, then rationality requires him to choose whichever method is cost-effective. If
A costs him £100 and B costs him £110, then ceteris paribus, he must choose A.

b. Dramatic Ignorance
The notion of Natural Ignorance and its role in the Creditors’ Bargain have been discussed
above. Natural Ignorance allows parties to know who they are, what attributes they have, and
what they value. It only precludes knowledge of how a particular transaction would turn out
for these Real Parties. The problem is that, in any contractarian theory of justice, ‘The
arbitrariness of the world must be corrected for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial
contractual situation.’113 But Jackson’s ex ante position happily reflects that arbitrariness.
The first part of this article concluded by suggesting that without more, there is no moral
force in choices made by naturally ignorant parties.
Contrast that notion of uncertainty with Dramatic Ignorance. The astute reader would
have gathered by now the significance of the adjective. Performed drama involves the
enactment of an often fictional situation by people playing often fictional characters. But
despite being ‘made up’, good drama involves interaction in recognisable (even if unfamiliar)
contexts between characters with recognisable attributes. It speaks to the concerns of its reallife audience, offering insight into familiar everyday reality. Drama is often ‘dramatic’ in
another way. It focuses on and exaggerates certain elements of that reality, perhaps forcing a
reassessment of their significance.
The ACM is somewhat similar. Its aim is to analyse and justify the principles of
insolvency law. To this end, it identifies peculiar insolvency issues and gathers together all
the parties affected by these issues. It then imbues them with the constructive attributes it
claims democratic society expects of its citizens as legislators. To revert to the simple drama
analogy, the cast are now ‘made up’ and ready to walk out of the wings onto the stage. Once
there, they will solemnly act out the roles allotted to them, choosing the principles of justice
governing corporate insolvency. But once on stage, they would also have cast off their
personalities and characteristics, assuming instead their dramatic personae. In the
terminology employed here, they would be in a state of Dramatic Ignorance.
The ACM requires all insolvency principles to be agreed to by all the relevant parties.
But this agreement must not be extracted under conditions of Natural Ignorance. It must be
fair, entered into under appropriate circumstances. It must be based on the premise that
parties are free and equal, and it must not allow some of them to dominate others because of
strength, financial clout, or superior bargaining skill. The first half of this article considered
one reason why the existence of such factors, without more, renders an agreement unjust.
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Natural Ignorance does not work because it allows parties knowledge of such attributes
during the bargaining, and parties can use these factors to influence the bargaining process.
Weaker parties have not therefore been treated fairly in having their interests represented by
the rules eventually chosen. But note another, somewhat different reason why Natural
Ignorance does not guarantee fairness. It allows parties knowledge of their social position and
their conception of the good. In proposing and assessing insolvency principles, parties would
favour that position and further that conception of the good. But:
the fact that we occupy a particular social position is not a good reason for us to
propose, or to expect others to accept, a conception of justice that favors those
in this position.114
So the fact that one is a bank or a tort creditor or a director, that one is likely to lend secured
or unsecured, is not a good reason for proposing rules of justice favouring that position, or
which further the interests typically associated with that position. Rules of justice must be
impartial, giving equal weight to the concerns of all groups of claimants.
Note also that insolvency law does not simply affect those actually faced with peculiar
insolvency issues. It also has an impact on others who anticipate having to face such issues
and plan accordingly. Parties often conduct their dealings with an eye on numerous
contingencies, not all of which materialise during the course of their transactions. This is
certainly true of insolvency. It is also the case that parties bargain in the shadow of the law.
They make plans, demand rights, and accept liabilities, all in anticipation of how they will be
treated, should insolvency law affect any part of their dealings. So in selecting principles of
insolvency law, the interests of such parties -- i.e. those who must plan their affairs because
they might face issues peculiar to insolvency, but who actually turn out not to be thus
affected -- must also be protected. To safeguard these interest, parties in Dramatic Ignorance
are deprived of knowledge about whether the debtor in question will in fact become
insolvent. Since they do not know whether they would actually have to deal with insolvency
issues, or merely to make plans to do so without actually having to rely on those plans, the
parties would choose principles which pay equal regard to the set of interests associated with
each of those affected by insolvency law.
So Dramatic Ignorance attains two goals. First, it strips parties of knowledge of their
own attributes, circumstances, social positions, degree of risk aversion, and conceptions of
the good. It also excludes knowledge of one’s ‘native endowments’, strength, intelligence,
and bargaining savvy.115 It prevents the parties knowing whether they will be faster in
collecting debts, or friendlier with the debtor, or particularly badly hit by the debtor’s
insolvency. This is the ‘obscuring’ role of Dramatic Ignorance.
Second, it ensures that what is essential to the ‘true and genuine person’ is left behind.
Here is how this is achieved. Note first of all that the choice position is ‘a case of pure
procedural justice.’ This means there are no external criteria, independent of those specified
by the ACM, by which the fairness or justice of the chosen principles can be judged. Because
the affected parties themselves, ‘symmetrically situated’ in the choice position, 116 are to
choose principles, the choice is taken to be that of principles for free and equal citizens. This
also indicates how the choice position models the parties’ liberty, equality, and
reasonableness. That citizens affected by insolvency issues are to be regarded as free is
modelled by the rationality of the parties in the choice position.117 In this position, parties
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anticipate the various conceptions of the good they might turn out to have, and are able
rationally to provide the means for enabling any such conception to be pursued through their
choice of insolvency principles. That the choice position is a case of pure procedural justice
models the citizens’ rational autonomy. They are bound by nothing except what they
themselves would specify as free and equal persons.118 That citizens are equal is modelled by
the choice position placing all the parties symmetrically. As long as one has the capacity to
form a conception of the good, and the capacity to be moved by considerations of reciprocity,
one is admitted to the choice position, and there has equal influence on the choice of
principles.119 The symmetry of the choice position also models citizens’ reasonableness, and
Dramatic Ignorance means the parties do not know who they will turn out to be and what
would be their conception of the good. This ensures the principles are impartially chosen and
fulfil the requirements of reciprocity.120
Parties in this state, while not omniscient, are also regarded as having all the
knowledge they need to reach decisions on insolvency issues, including knowledge of social,
economic, and political theory. They also have access to all the relevant empirical data then
available. (More accurately, of course, the parties have all the knowledge materially and
intellectually accessible to the person expounding the ACM.) That the parties are suitably
knowledgeable, and that they are free, equal and reasonable, is ensured through the
‘exaggerating’ role of Dramatic Ignorance.

c. The choice position
It is time to deal with two objections made to the construction of the choice position. Each of
these objections is ultimately spurious, and in arguing against them, one ends up with a richer
appreciation of the fundamental ideas in which the ACM is grounded.121
The first objection is to Dramatic Ignorance. It was pointed out in the first part of this
paper that the Creditors’ Bargain is based on a contractarian model developed by Richard
Posner. Jackson takes from Posner the ingredients which go into the construction of the
Creditors’ Bargain. A very important one of these is Natural Ignorance. Parties in the
Creditors’ Bargain know who they are and what they want, but not how their transactions
with the debtor are going to turn out. Posner gives two reasons for preferring Natural
Ignorance to what here has been called Dramatic Ignorance.122 The more interesting
objection concerns the sort of claims the parties in Dramatic Ignorance must take into
account. Since parties do not know their own attributes, they do not know whether they
would turn out to be talented and hardworking, or lazy and unproductive. Given this factor,
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Posner claims any choice position based on Dramatic (rather than Natural) Ignorance ‘opens
the door to the claims of the unproductive.’ In order to look after their interests if they do
turn out to be unproductive, the parties would have to ensure the rules chosen in the choice
position gave as much importance to the claims of lazy and unproductive people, as those of
diligent and productive ones. ‘[T]he choices of the unproductive are weighted equally with
those of the productive.’ The result is objectionable, concludes Posner, because it ‘obscures
the important moral distinction... between capacity to enjoy and capacity to produce for
others’.123 While productive people have both, unproductive ones only have the former.
This objection reveals rather nicely the extent of Posner’s misunderstanding of a true
Rawlsian choice position of the sort sketched out here. Note first of all that Posner seems to
think parties in that position, like the parties in the ex ante position of the Creditors’ Bargain,
are doing no more than expressing preferences. Since these preferences are shaped by
nothing but one’s whims and self-interest, parties can express any preference without
restriction. But of course this is wrong. Because of the construction of the choice position,
parties must act reasonably. Here, they are not merely expressing preferences, they are
selecting principles of justice. In order to do that, they must propose principles others can
reasonably accept.124 Further, ‘in selecting principles of justice the parties must... take into
account the consequences of those principles being mutually recognised and how this affects
citizens’ conceptions of themselves and their motivation to act from those principles.’125
Parties are also rational. They realise that (given Posner’s assumptions) unproductive people
can only be sustained through the efforts and work of productive people.
Two conclusions follow. First, if there are too many unproductive people in any
society, not enough would be produced to sustain everyone and that society would collapse.
In order to ensure this does not happen, the principles chosen to govern everyone equally
would be likely to discourage rampant un-productivity. And second, citizens in actual society
are constructively regarded as fully co-operating members of society. Co-operation is based
on reciprocity, and on not making demands against others which one would be unwilling
(though able) to meet oneself. For some people to require others to work so as to sustain them
while not reciprocating in kind is to make an exploitative demand. Reasonable persons do not
make exploitative demands. And it undermines citizens’ motivation to uphold principles if
they regard them as exploitative. So exploitative demands would not be enshrined in the
principles of justice selected in the choice position. Put the two factors together and it should
be clear Posner is wrong in thinking the claims of the unproductive would be given equal
weight to those of the productive.126
Note also that in the specific corporate insolvency context, the assumption of
rationality itself rules out paying heed to the claims of the unproductive. Companies are
created to attain certain ends. ‘[People] usually become involved with companies with the
intention of improving their economic position. [So they would want] to have their affairs
governed by rules which are designed to foster efficient outcomes.’127 Within the limits set
by society (for example through environmental standards, laws on labour rights, product
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liability and misrepresentation etc.), then, companies must maximise profits for their
shareholders (or otherwise maximise shareholder value).128
If charitable, they must
maximise the output for charitable purposes. Rational parties do not tolerate knowing unproductivity in ventures such as these, since un-productivity is the antithesis of the very
reason why companies exist. And if the claims of the unproductive will not be tolerated in the
company’s solvency, there seems little reason why they should be in its insolvency. Even in
the very unlikely case where someone creates a company in order to avoid having to work
hard, that person’s claims against the company are at an end once it is insolvent. The
company’s assets belong to the creditors,129 who are unlikely to want to indulge his desire for
leisure in deciding what they should do with those assets. Rational parties anticipate all this
while deciding which principles to choose. Because of rationality and reasonableness, then,
Posner’s objection to Dramatic Ignorance turns out not to be effective.
Now for the second objection. Recall that by the time the relevant parties reach the
choice position, they have been rendered (dramatically) ignorant of any knowledge of
personal attributes or conceptions of the good. By virtue of being symmetrically situated in
the choice position, the parties can not choose other than to protect their equality:
The right of each[] to be treated equally without regard to [their] person or
character or tastes is enforced by the fact that no one else can secure a better
position by virtue of being different in any such respect.130
Parties seek to further their self-interest in choosing the principles to govern insolvency
situation, but ‘The state of ignorance in the [choice] position is so shaped that the antecedent
interest of everyone must lie [] in the same solution.’131
This ensures agreement. But (it might be asked) since all the parties have no
knowledge of who they are, of what they value, or of their own advantage, how are they to
decide which principles would better serve their self-interest?
This objection is not difficult to meet. If the choice situation were designed to settle
principles of justice for all aspects of society, then the lack of knowledge by the parties of
their own conception of the good might pose serious problems. The parties in Dramatic
Ignorance know they have a capacity to have, develop, and revise some such conception.
Once out of Dramatic Ignorance, they will discover what they value. But before that point,
how do they decide what set of principles best protects and furthers interests they do not then
know they have? One popular response is to stipulate parties want certain ‘primary goods’.
These are ‘all-purpose means normally needed for...pursuing conceptions of the good with
widely different contents.’132 In the general society-wide context, the primary goods are
defined to include basic rights and liberties like ‘freedom of movement, free choice of
occupation protected by fair equality of opportunity..., income and wealth’ etc. So parties
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judge the proposed principles on the basis of how effectively they ensure a distribution of
primary goods which would serve the sort of conceptions of the good they might turn out to
have.133
It is tempting to follow these general theories in stipulating a fairly abstract primary
good the parties faced with the peculiar circumstances of insolvency are regarded as desiring
in the choice position, no matter what their conception of the good. For example, Korobkin
asserts parties in the choice situation are to be regarded as desiring ‘the best possible position
to influence the actions and decisions of the financially distressed corporation’.134 The ACM
resists the urge to remove too far from the context and actual circumstances of corporate
insolvency the stipulated choice of what all parties are presumed to want. In society
generally, citizens pursue a myriad of objectives, aims, goals and desires. They have
immensely varied conceptions of what makes life worth living. In choosing principles of
justice to regulate all of society, it is right to regard them as wanting fairly abstract rights of
the sort mentioned above, because only such abstract rights would serve the pursuit of most
conceptions of the good.
But in insolvency circumstances, the ‘primary good’ all relevant parties, no matter
what their conception of the good must in the final analysis want, is the insolvent’s assets.
Parties in the choice situation know, after all, that by definition it is the fact of these assets
being insufficient to meet the debtor’s liabilities, which gives rise to all situations peculiar to
insolvency. Tort victims, secured and unsecured creditors, and shareholders, all want to
ensure the insolvent’s assets are used so as to benefit them. Employees who claim their jobs
should be protected in a situation somehow peculiar to corporate insolvency are claiming
precisely the same right. They wish the firm’s assets to be deployed so as to ensure they will
continue to enjoy the benefits associated with those assets being thus deployed. This would
include having a workplace they have invested in and value, their fruitful association with
work-mates, and of course their salaries, wages and bonuses. Directors who become subject
to wrongful trading claims have similarly deployed the insolvent’s assets to their own ends,
rather than in trying to minimise harm to the company’s creditors. Members of a community
who claim to be affected by peculiar insolvency circumstances again want the firm’s assets to
be deployed so as to provide them all the benefits they claim they would lose because of
insolvency.
Parties in the choice position know, then, that no matter what their conception of the
good turns out to be, and no matter how they turn out to be related to the insolvent firm, what
they would want is the insolvent’s assets. They therefore judge the acceptability of all
proposed principles by reference to how they ensure the parties would have access to those
assets, no matter who they turn out to be.
It should be clear by now why the principles chosen in the choice position produce
normative force and are to be considered binding. The choice position includes conditions as
to the nature of the parties, and on their state of knowledge ‘that we do in fact accept [as
normatively attractive]. Or if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by
philosophical reflection.’ Each element of the choice position can be supported from within
the political and legal culture of this society.135 Any party affected by a peculiar insolvency
situation can enter the choice position at any time by imposing on its own reasoning the
constraints which define the choice position, and by acknowledging that binding principles of
law must be of general application, not merely suitable for a particular transaction. It can then
ask whether it accepts the principles binding it as fair. The choice position is ‘a device of
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representation [and] serves as a means of public reflection and self-clarification. It helps us
work out what we now think, once we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what
justice requires when society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal
citizens’.136

12. THE PERFORMANCE
It has been pointed out that the stay on individual actions by unsecured creditors has been a
part of bankruptcy and insolvency law, as it were, from the day that there has been such a
law. The collective regime defined by the stay is the most central and unchallenged aspect of
the process of winding up companies. The stay on unsecured claims is a ‘provisional fixed
point’, then. That it should exist and be part of insolvency law is one of our ‘settled
convictions’ about this area of the law.137 We feel confident, and can agree, that independent
action by the unsecured creditors of an insolvent should be stayed, whether or not we agree
on any other aspect of the insolvency regime. Very persuasive reasons indeed would have to
be produced to convince us the stay should no longer be part of insolvency law. Till such
reasons are forthcoming, any explanatory theory about the insolvency regime should be able
to account for the stay. If it does not, it can not claim to be an account of this regime. We
condemned the Creditors’ Bargain precisely because it fails this test. Does the ACM do any
better?
It is suggested the very reasons which led to the failure of the Bargain heuristic
descriptively to account for the automatic stay, must also compel the conclusion that the
ACM succeeds. The Real Parties premise of the Creditors’ Bargain meant unequal parties
would either not accept a stay at all, or would accept a rule which reflected the inequality in
their debt-collection and bargaining skills. And the lack of any specific ex ante point at which
the counterfactual agreement was to be concluded meant that the self-interest of the parties,
which drove the agreement, would be different depending on when (temporally or as a
function of the parties’ knowledge of personal attributes) it was ascertained. It was noted that
Jackson’s strategy for dealing with these issues -- the assumption that all (‘real’) creditors are
identical -- gave the game away by violating every single condition of his model (‘real world
parties’, ‘actual endowments’, ‘natural ignorance’).
The ACM is very different. It first ascertains who should be included among the
parties who would be asked to accept or reject the automatic stay. It does this by asking
whose rights and prospects are affected by the automatic stay in a way peculiar to the
circumstances of corporate insolvency. These parties include all the insolvent’s shareholders,
and all its unsecured creditors, consensual, non-consensual, adjusting and non-adjusting. The
collective regime defined by the automatic stay compulsorily deprives these parties of the
ability to proceed against the debtor company in a way unique to insolvency. The discussion
in Sections 8 and 9 above shows it remains to be demonstrated that any other party is thus
affected by the automatic stay. In addition, for the shareholders, insolvency proceedings
might confirm at law what might already be the case in fact, that there being insufficient
assets to pay off creditors, they (the shareholders) are no longer the residual claimants to the
company’s assets. Again, this is unique to insolvency situations.
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These parties are then stripped of any knowledge of personal attributes and put in a
state of Dramatic Ignorance. The model justifies this by pointing out that in proposing and
accepting rules of justice, it is morally irrelevant whether a party is faster or more effective in
collecting debts, or whether it is wealthier and better able to monitor the debtor, as long as
the interests of all such parties are given equal and fair consideration. This is ensured by the
construction of the choice position. Here, all the parties seek to further their antecedent selfinterest, constrained by considerations of reciprocity. Since the parties do not know who they
will turn out to be once the state of Dramatic Ignorance is removed, they must equally take
into account the interests of all the actual people they might find themselves to be.
In the choice position, the parties realise that the insolvency of the debtor leads to a
common pool problem in the way described in the first part of this article. All the creditors
would have to expend resources monitoring the debtor and racing for its assets, and the race
might lead to a value-destroying break-up of the debtor’s business. The parties in the choice
position also anticipate at least some real-life creditors would be risk averse. The utility of
such creditors would be increased by assuring them a lower but more certain return on their
loans than would be the case under the individualistic non-insolvency regime.138 Parties
would also realise that shareholders (who by definition have agreed to postpone their claims
to those of the company’s creditors if there is doubt about the company’s solvency) would
benefit from maximising the value of the collective pool of the company’s assets. Those
assets might be sold off together as a going concern if that is how they are most valuable.
Alternatively, they might be disposed of piecemeal. Whatever the case, a procedure which
can review all the possibilities and settle on the optimal result would be more likely to ensure
shareholders receive any potential surplus from the sale. In addition and as noted, a collective
liquidation regime minimises the uncertainty inherent in any individualistic post-insolvency
regime about the creditors’ respective positions in the queue for the debtor’s assets. This
would be reflected in the interest charged by adjusting creditors on their loans during the
company’s solvency. Since the company would have to pay less on financing its debts, more
would be available for disbursement to the shareholders. Realising this, a party in the original
position would be willing to accept the automatic stay even though they might turn out to be
a shareholder of the company rather than a creditor.
Note another very important consideration for the parties in the choice position. They
anticipate that they might turn out to be a creditor particularly vulnerable to, and badly
affected by, the debtor’s insolvency. Certain employee-creditors arguably are an example,
since they are usually dependent solely on their salaries, might be unable to diversify by
working for more than one employer, might have no insurance because they are not able to
join a trade union which would buy such insurance for its members, and might be unable
quickly to find work on losing their job. It might be possible, in the choice position, to make
an argument that such creditors deserve more protection in the insolvency forum than a welldiversified bank-creditor, say. But the parties in the choice position accept a distinction that
will be referred to as that between immunity and priority. It might be that employee-creditors
deserve priority over bank-creditors in being paid out of the insolvent’s estate for the reasons
mentioned. But that is a separate question from whether employee-creditors should be
immune from having to give up individual debt-collection rights and being forced to
participate in the collective regime characterised by the automatic stay. Even if employee
claims should be met before bank claims, it would be in the collective interest of employees
and banks alike to maximise the pool of assets from which all these claims would be met, in
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whatever order.139 The question of how the insolvent’s assets should be distributed can be
and often is a different question from how they should be deployed.140
Parties also anticipate some of them would turn out to be creditors of the sort who are
not benefited by the automatic stay in most individual transactions. This would be the case
with creditors who are repeat players, are well-diversified, and have the resources to position
themselves advantageously for the individualistic race for the insolvent’s assets.141 But in the
choice position, the principles laying down the automatic stay would still be chosen. Parties
of course do not know who they will turn out to be. They might turn out to be the type of
creditor who could do better in the individualistic race, but they might not. Faced with this
uncertainty, the parties would put themselves in the position of both sorts of creditor. They
would ask what their prospects would be under the collective regime marked by the stay.
This regime enhances the value of the pool of assets available collectively to all creditors. So
to grant any type of creditor immunity from having to participate in this regime is to impose
costs on all the creditors as a group. But this is not decisive for the parties. Suppose the
collective regime would threaten the vital interests of a creditor of type X. Parties anticipate
they might turn out to be a creditor of this type. So they would not risk leaving such vital
interests unprotected simply because that enhances the pool of assets available to all.
All the parties in the choice position together might accept a smaller pool of assets,
then, if the only alternative is to inflict significant harm to the prospects of one type of
creditor. Each party has some incentive to agree to this, because each party has an equal
chance (as against each other party) of turning out to be such a creditor. If the automatic stay
does turn out to threaten some type of creditor in this way, the parties would contemplate
giving that creditor immunity from it. But in fact, the type of creditor who could do better
without a stay is precisely the sort best able to cope with the effects of the stay if it is
imposed. Well-financed repeat players can anticipate the effects of the stay on their own
prospects, and can adjust their lending terms or their interest rates accordingly. They are also
likely to be well-diversified. Other types of creditor who have influence over the debtor even
though they are not repeat players (e.g. directors who have leant to their company) ought to
be well-informed about the debtor’s prospects, can control the debtor’s actions, and can still
adjust the terms of their loans. In either case, the automatic stay does not threaten any of their
vital interests. And again, it would still be possible for any party to make an argument that,
within the collective regime, some types of creditor should be given priority over other types.
It is important to be clear about the differences between the reasoning of the parties in
the choice position, and of the creditors in Jackson’s ex ante position. In the latter, creditors
who can do well under the individualistic debt-collection regime would want that regime.
They do not care about the size of the common pool of assets. As long as they are paid, they
do not mind if their activities have an adverse effect on others. For repeat players, the
accumulated expertise of collecting debt and the associated economies of scale are tools to be
used to seek the best position for the individualistic race. Diversification is the way of
ensuring even if one does not win a particular race, the harm thus done can be remedied by
winning other races. In this way, these creditors can pass on the costs of their race for the
insolvent’s assets to all the other creditors, and being motivated only by self-interest, would
indeed do so.
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For the parties in the choice position, on the other hand, there are no ‘others’ to whom
these costs can be passed. All the parties equally must take them into account. The stay seems
to protect the interests of parties (especially one-off transactors) who as a group simply
would not have any chance of competing against repeat players in the individualistic race,
and (for non-consensual creditors) might have had little control over the terms of the loan.
And the parties in the choice position know that the creditors worst affected by the automatic
stay (creditors who are not risk averse in any particular transaction because they are repeat
players, and those having insider knowledge of the company’s prospects, etc.) have the
ability to diversify and to adjust interest rates and other terms of the loan to compensate for
the effects of the stay. This assures them such creditors would not suffer harm to their vital
interests if they are indeed subjected to the collective regime.
So in the choice position, and reinforced by understanding the priority/immunity
distinction, all the parties would select the automatic stay on unsecured claims.

13. THE DENOUEMENT
It is time to note the implications and consolidate the results. The ACM is a descriptive and
analytic device. By focusing on insolvency law as a scheme of fair co-operation in insolvency
situations, it helps illuminate the deep structure of the automatic stay. It shows how all the
relevant parties, motivated by antecedent self-interest and considerations of reciprocity,
would consent to the collective regime defined by the stay. And importantly, it also indicates
focusing on the stay in isolation provides an incomplete picture. Arguably, parties in the
choice position might find the automatic stay in their interest if they turn out to be a
particular type of creditor only if such creditors are assured a certain priority within the
collective insolvency regime.
The ACM is also a justificatory device. It sees all parties as free and equal, reasonable
and rational. By removing factors which are morally irrelevant in proposing and accepting
principles of justice, the model ensures the principles chosen are fair and just. As a result, the
principles recommended by the ACM can be seen as having been consented to by ‘true and
genuine’ persons. They are justified because they are chosen in exercise of the full political
autonomy of all those they will govern:
[Full] autonomy is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice
that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when
fairly represented as free and equal persons.142
Finally, and as promised (in Section 3 above), a word to the sceptic who is tempted to
make the innocent claim that the ACM is just another form of the Creditors’ Bargain. It might
be said the ‘only’ difference between the two is that the former employs Dramatic Ignorance.
The Creditors’ Bargain is unsuccessful because it seeks to ascertain the counterfactual
consent of creditors who are aware at that time of who they are. This ensures either that no
agreement would be reached, or if reached would be exploitative and oppressive of weaker
parties. But the solution is straightforward. Simply deprive the creditors of the Creditors’
Bargain of any knowledge of who they are, and at a stroke, one solves all the problems which
beset that model. Someone who does take this view might wonder why the intelligent people
who have been writing in the Creditors’ Bargain tradition for the last two decades have not
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thought of this simple move before! Why for example does Jackson base the Bargain model
on Real Parties in Natural Ignorance? This means he is forced to assume later that all (‘real’)
creditors are homogeneous, and then has to go to torturous lengths to argue even nonhomogeneous creditors would accept the automatic stay.143 Surely a simpler way would have
been to stipulate that all creditors are to be rendered homogenous by being deprived of any
knowledge of personal attributes at the time that their consent is notionally sought. But
neither Jackson nor any other expositor of the Bargain has done that.
The answer, of course, is that the move is not simple at all. What divides the Creditors’
Bargain and the ACM is not a narrow slit consisting of dissimilar types of uncertainty (the
two versions of Ignorance). It is a wide chasm of profound philosophical differences. This
can be made clear in the following way. Suppose S, a scholar sympathetic to the Creditors’
Bargain, suggests the Bargain model should drop Natural Ignorance in favour of Dramatic
Ignorance. So the notional consent of creditors should be sought after stripping them of any
knowledge of what sort of creditor they are (voluntary or involuntary, bank or employee,
etc.). How would S justify this move? Let us assist by suggesting four possible ways. First,
the move from Natural to Dramatic Ignorance might be supported by saying this is the only
way for the Creditors’ Bargain to predict the automatic stay on unsecured claims. But surely
this just begs the question. If the move is nothing more than the rigging of the model to attain
the desired result, it is intellectually dishonest. What is required is a justification, and the
need to save an otherwise failing theory is not an attractive justification.
Second, S might simply decline our demand for a justification for the Natural to
Dramatic move. He might reply, for example, that it is just convenient to base the Creditors’
Bargain on Dramatic Ignorance. But real creditors are unlikely ever to be unaware of who
they are and of their conceptions of the good.144 As already mentioned, they are entitled to
ask why the notional choices of non-existent creatures who seem so different from them
should have any significance for them. Why should real creditors accept as fair or binding
rules supposedly chosen by creatures who are figments of S’s imagination? S has no
response.
He might now claim all he is concerned with is the Bargain model’s ability to predict
and explain the collective liquidation regime. Making the assumption that creditors are
unaware of personal attributes at the time their consent is sought allows him to do that, and
he might state that he feels no obligation to justify that regime to those subject to it. Now of
course the refusal to justify laws to those governed by them is rather repugnant to democratic
societies, and might lose the Creditors’ Bargain some support. Laws must be legitimate, not
just imposed. But even in the claim that S can predict and explain the automatic stay, he
would be only half-right, half of the time. By arbitrarily adopting Dramatic Ignorance, his
model would certainly have acquired the power to predict the automatic stay. But it still can
not explain it. S’s position now can be compared to that of a young child who has learnt to
predict that by pressing a switch on a torch light, she can produce a beam of light. But the
child can not assign any meaning to the fact of pressing the switch. She can not explain the
role of the internal wiring, the batteries, the bulb, the plastic case, the reflectors, etc. And if
pressing the switch no longer works because the batteries run out, or the bulb fails, or water
seeps through the case and short-circuits the wiring, the child would be at a loss to suggest
anything useful. Such would be the case with S. He could baldly state that by using Dramatic
Ignorance, one could predict that insolvency law would stay all unsecured claims. But he can
not assign any meaning to the use of these strange Dramatically Ignorant creatures, seemingly
so different from real-life creditors. Nor can he employ the principles which justify use of
143

See the first half of this article.
This is where Carlson’s comments ‘Philosophy’, p 1344, concerning widows and investment
bankers, noted supra, are relevant.
144

38

Dramatic Ignorance to criticise the liquidation system or suggest reform, should
circumstances change and the system is no longer appropriate. But surely we are entitled to
expect more illumination from insolvency law scholars than we do from the child with the
torch.
Finally, though, S might produce a more satisfactory response. He might reply that it is
right and proper for those selecting binding rules to be required to do so impartially, and that
Dramatic Ignorance achieves precisely that. This would be a good justification, and the
beginning of the process which leads to the ACM. But in saying that, S would also decisively
have rejected the Creditors’ Bargain. His suggestion now is based on the idea that each
person matters equally. This needs to be given substance. The ACM accomplishes that by
regarding as equal all those who have the moral capacity to form and revise a conception of
the good, and the moral capacity to be moved by considerations of reciprocity. These two
moral powers are accepted as logically prior to the hypothetical contract, and are essential to
qualify for participation in it. The choice position as defined by Dramatic Ignorance is
appropriate because it gives substance to the idea of moral equality, and by extension, to the
right of all moral equals to equal care and concern in the selection of binding principles.
But these notions are profoundly alien to the Creditors’ Bargain. As a mutual
advantage theory, the model sees ‘justice’ as an extension of brute rational choice.145 Its aim
is to prove one could manufacture the principles supporting the insolvency regime by
appealing to nothing but rational self-interest. So the Bargain is based on nothing but
preferences, and these are shaped by nothing but one’s self-interest. Since the Bargain model
assumes it can do without any reference to morality, it can make no appeal to fairness. It has
no conception of pre-existing moral powers. It perceives ‘no moral equality underneath our
natural physical inequality’.146 The Bargain here is not used to give substance to more
abstract rights which are prior to it. Rather, it is used in an effort to create rights where none
existed before.147 The Bargain model can not explain the move of stripping away the
individuality of the parties during the bargaining process, about why the parties should accept
anything decided in Dramatic Ignorance.148 And it simply has no theory or notion about what
– if anything – would be left behind once the parties’ individuality has been thus removed.149
So Dramatic Ignorance is forbidden to this model. The use of Dramatic Ignorance in the
ACM requires significant philosophical commitments.150 But if it were to make those
commitments, the Creditors’ Bargain would cease to be what it is, a model based on the
(false) claim of moral neutrality.151 Expositors of the Bargain model want to make that claim,
and so can not make those commitments. It should be clear, then, that in both premises and
conclusions, the Creditors’ Bargain and the ACM are worlds apart.152
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14. CONCLUSION
This article pits the long-established Creditors’ Bargain construct against a model that is
developed in the second half of the article. It puts the Creditors’ Bargain through its paces,
examining its fundamentals, rationale, and construction. The Creditors’ Bargain is unable to
describe a central part of insolvency law, is arbitrary and incoherent, and lacks justificatory
force. It tries to legitimate the automatic stay by suggesting actual creditors at a hypothetical
pre-transaction stage would agree to just such a rule. But it fails.
The confusion inherent in the Creditors’ Bargain makes it clear that:
[One] cannot merely invoke the fact that under circumstances C agent A would
prefer option O. One must explain the propriety of describing the circumstances
in a particular way, of attributing particular characteristics and interests to the
agents in the choice position, and of giving them a particular menu of options.
Perhaps this would take legal writers too far into the muddles of moral
philosophy. If so, it might be the better part of valor to eschew appeal to
arguments of this kind.153
All that is true, and the warning is apt. But a principled analysis and justification of
this central feature of insolvency law must surely by sought. So the ACM sets off to avoid the
faults of the Creditors’ Bargain. It decides on the menu of options to present to the parties in
the choice position by asking, ‘What makes insolvency law special?’ It defends the
characteristics it attributes to the parties by claiming the legal and political culture of society
demands citizens be considered free, equal, and reasonable, when consulted on the design of
institutions meant to govern them. And it justifies the propriety of defining the choice
position in a particular way by pointing out that the choice of principles should not be
influenced by morally irrelevant features and considerations of legislators, who in turn should
act rationally in choosing such principles. It is therefore claimed the resulting model can
analyse and justify corporate insolvency law and its longest-standing feature.
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